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THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE HOLY SEE AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL:
A NEW LEGAL REGIME OF CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS+
Father David-Maria A. Jaeger, O.F.M., J.C.D.*
FOREWORD
As a participant in the negotiations that produced the Fundamental
Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel, and in the fol-
low-up negotiations, which produced the "Legal Personality Agreement"
now awaiting signature, it is my purpose to bear witness on this occasion
to certain aspects of the larger significance and legal impact of that
Agreement. Notwithstanding actual statements of fact, my testimony re-
flects strictly my own understanding of the guiding principles and larger
purpose of the Agreement and is not given on behalf of any other person
or institution.
Accordingly, this is no more than a superficial treatment of a number
of serious questions. Historical, constitutional, political, and even relig-
ious questions are touched upon in some manner or other by the Agree-
ment. Inevitably, recourse has to be made to overbroad generalizations
and excessive simplifications of deep and complex issues. This is, in fact,
only an outline for a much larger study already in progress, which will
amount to a history of, and a commentary on, the Fundamental Agree-
ment.
+ This is the full text of the paper prepared for delivery at the April 8, 1997 sympo-
sium at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. This text has been
edited by the Catholic University Law Review.
* The Rev. Dr. David-Maria A. Jaeger is a Catholic Priest, a Member of the Cus-
tody of the Holy Land of the Franciscan Order of Friars Minor, and a Doctor of Canon
Law. He has served as the Holy Land Correspondent for the London-based weekly, THE
TABLET; Liaison Secretary of the United Christian Council in Israel; Director of the
"Study, Research and Publication" program on Christianity in the Holy Land at the Ecu-
menical Institute for Advanced Theological Studies, Tantur, Jerusalem; Professor of
Canon Law at the Jerusalem and Rome campuses of the Pontifical Athenaeum "Antonia-
num"; Professor of Canon Law at the Faculty of Easter Canon Law in Rome; and member
of the Delegation of the Holy See and the State of Israel. Currently Father Jaeger is the
Vicar Judicial in the Diocese of Austin, Texas. He recently has been appointed as the
Consultor of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 1993, Pope John Paul II delivered an address, which
traced in bold, imaginative lines a new vision for the future of the Chris-
tian presence in a renewed Middle East.1 Speaking to a convention of
experts in Roman and Canon Law that was being held at the Pontifical
Lateran University in Rome, the Supreme Pontiff reviewed the Church's
centuries-long search for a legally secure existence in a region which saw
the birth, successively, of the three great monotheistic religions. The
Holy Father spoke of the ways pursued in the past to assure the Christian
religious minorities a necessary autonomous space, which have borne
fruit in legal and social institutions that deserve recognition and esteem.
However, the Pontiff emphasized that "the profound social changes" of
our times render "insufficient the sole safeguards traditionally accorded
to personal situations or to individually construed aspects of worship."2
Recently, he has stated:
[T]he freedom of religion cannot, in fact, be reduced to the sole
freedom of worship, but includes also the right to non-
discrimination in the exercise of the other rights and of the
freedom that are proper to every human person, considered
both in its individual and in its communitarian dimension.
3
This contemporary insight into the exigencies intrinsic to the dignity of
the human person poses a challenge and a task to every state. Quoting a
decision issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the
Holy Father said that each state is called to examine its own legal order
and to modify and perfect it accordingly.4 "A mature conception of the
State and of its legal order," the Pontiff proceeds, "inspired by that which
the common conscience of humanity has expressed in the rules of the in-
ternational community, demands the effort to ensure equality of treat-
ment to every person, irrespective of his ethnic, linguistic, cultural and
religious origin."5 He concludes that it is in societies that are built or re-
fashioned in accordance with these principles that "it will be possible to
guarantee, increasingly better, also to the Christians of the Eastern Medi-
terranean, a future that will preserve their special identity and will be re-
1. See Giovanni Paolo II, Discorso ai partecipanti al IX Colloquio Internazionale
Romanistico-Canonistico organizzato dalla Pontificia Universitd Lateranense, in
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spectful of the human person and his fundamental rights.",
6
The Supreme Pontiff is calling here, in effect, for a paradigm shift in
the church-state relationship that became the norm in the Middle East in
the seventh century, and that the State of Israel also inherited upon its
creation in 1948. Fewer than three weeks after the Pontiff's address, on
December 30, 1993, the Holy See and the State of Israel signed their
Fundamental Agreement, which represents the first concrete application
of the new paradigm and creates a new and different kind of legal rela-
tionship between the Church and the state in that region.
II. THE ANCIEN RtGIME
The modem problems of church-state relations in the Holy Land
originated with the Muslim conquest in 638.' To be sure, there had been
earlier problems in this region. For instance, problems in church-state
relations existed in the period beginning at Pentecost and ending in the
fourth century with a series of legal dispositions that first assured the
Church its freedom and then Christianized the Roman Empire itself.
With the freedom of the Church, and even more with the Christian con-
fessionalization of the Empire, which included the Holy Land, the previ-
ous problems ended except for some episodic recrudescence, such as
those occurring under Julian the Apostate (362-365). This momentous
transformation did not necessarily and at all times ensure the full liberty
of the Catholic Church in relation to the State. Subsequent conflicts
took place within Christendom and were thus internal to the Christian
Res publica. Even the Persian occupation of 614, while certainly destruc-
tive, did not alter the situation definitively. However, the conquest of
638 did alter the situation. A different, very definite legal order was
thereby established, which would only be interrupted with no lasting ef-
fect by the Crusades.
Having been governed between 639 and 1099 by the Muslim Arabs,
the Holy Land, after the withdrawal of the Crusaders, came under Mus-
lim Mameluk rule. In 1516-1517, the Holy Land passed into the hands of
the Muslim Ottoman Turks, thus remaining subject to the Muslim legal
system, which determined, among other things, the legal condition of the
6. Id.
7. See A. 0. ISSA, LES MINORITIS CHRtTIENNES DE PALESTINE A TRAVERS LES
SItCLES 22-65 (1977) (describing the events and developments concerning the juridical
condition of the Church in the period between Pentecost and the Constantinian Peace of
the Church).
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Church and Christians.8 While the political rulers, dynasties, and empires
changed, the meta-constitutional fundamentals of the Islamic Res pub-
lica, rooted in their shared religion, remained constant.
The Islamic Commonwealth is based on an absolute monism, which
consists of maintaining the unity of the spiritual and the temporal juridi-
cal spheres. It is, therefore, a pure theocracy, sensu pleno.9 The inten-
tional sphere of the Islamic legal order, or juridical universe, knows no
limit at all, either territorial or personal, given that it is destined to be ex-
tended to the whole world."' In terms of the actual situation, however,
the legal order draws a distinction between territory in which the Islamic
imperium already has been established effectively, namely the dar-al-
islam or "homestead of Islam," and territory that is still outside its rule,
and which is yet to make its submission-that is what the word Islam
means. This latter territory, called dar-al-harb or "home of war," is the
object of the believers' all-out efforts, designated jihad or "holy war," to
ensure its submission."
Comprised geographically within dar-al-islam, there may be unbeliev-
ers, who, while not yet ready to surrender to Islam in matters of religious
belief and practice, are prepared to submit to the Islamic imperium po-
litically. These unbelievers, provided they belong to the "People of the
Book" or ahl-al-kitab, a designation applicable principally to Jews and
Christians, may be spared the sword and may obtain the condition of re-
ligio tolerata for their beliefs and practices. To achieve this condition,
unbelievers must accept the status of ahl al-dhimma, which means sub-
8. Anything that is said here of Islamic legislation or political organization is not
meant to apply to any Muslim-majority political society existing today. Additionally, this
discussion is not intended to give any sort of illustration of Islamic religion and law. Ref-
erences to these realities are made only with respect to their incidental effect on the previ-
ously observable legal condition of the Church and its members in the region that cur-
rently corresponds to the territory of the State of Israel. For the general reader, a
reasonably brief, judiciously balanced view of the laws of Islam is offered by Y. Linant de
Bellefonds, Law, in 2 RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THREE RELIGIONS IN CONCORD
AND CONFLICT 413-58 (A.J. Arberry ed., 1969).
9. See SAMi AWAD ALDEEB ABU-SAHLIEH, L'IMPACT DE LA RELIGION SUR
L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE CAS DE L'EGYPTE NON-MUSULMANS EN PAYS D'ISLAM 45
(1979). Abu-Sahlieh observes that Muhammad "6tablit A Mddine le noyau du premier
Etat islamique, un Etat-religion, bas6 sur une loi r6v616e et sur un critre de distinction
religieux." Id. This is entirely different from the phenomenon of a state religion in Chris-
tendom. The Christian confessional State is predicated on the ultimately irreducible dual-
ity of the state and religion, no less than on their deliberate joining together.
10. Cf. N. ARMANAZI, L'ISLAM ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 98, 100 (1929).
11. Cf. ABU-SAHLIEH, supra note 9, at 48-49; N. ARMANAZI, supra note 10, at 69.
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stantially, "people under protection."' 2  Such a status is formalized
through the payment of a special poll tax and is construed as a status of
perpetual humiliation, which is due to their obstinate persistence in un-
believing, and lasting for as long as this resistance to Islam perdures.
Given the monistic nature of the Islamic Res publica, the status of
dhimma leads to the effective exclusion from it of those consigned to this
status. Moreover, it brings with it multiple public law disqualifications,
as well as many civil law and penal law restrictions and inequalities, while
the very toleratio of the religion itself is clearly circumscribed. 3 Even the
"autonomous" personal jurisdiction granted to the respective hierarchies
or religious authorities of dhimma communities is a concession that by its
nature does not empower its beneficiaries to claim or vindicate any rights
over the Islamic empire, within which they are meant to operate. The
absolute theocracity of the Islamic Res publica and the intrinsic anoma-
lousness of the dhimma status in relation to this seamless religious-
political continuum, or whole, do not allow for adequate ground on
which to take a stand in defense of the rights of those consigned to
dhimma status vis-A-vis the Islamic empire itself. 4
The circumscribed "autonomy" granted the dhimma communities in
matters that go well beyond the intrinsic exigencies of proper religious
governance is itself a potent double-edged sword. Superficially, this
"autonomy" could be presented, and has been presented by its apolo-
gists, as the expression of an enlightened tolerance, but in reality, it is
even more an expression, a cause, and an instrument of the effective iso-
lation of those considered to belong to those communities.
Given the seamless religious-political whole of the surrounding society,
Christians, under these conditions, were not even second class citizens.
Rather, qua Christians, they were effectively excluded from a society and
12. For the historical origins and early development of this status, in law as well as in
fact, see generally A. S. TRITFON, THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-MUSLIM SUBJECTS: A
CRITICAL STUDY OF THE COVENANT OF 'UMAR (1970). For a detailed historical-juridical
study of Islam from the very beginning to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, see ANTOINE
FATFAL, LE STATUT LtGAL DES NON-MUSULMANS EN PAYS D'ISLAM (1958). For an
unusual and somewhat idiosyncratic treatment, see BAT-YE'OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND
CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (David Maisel et al. trans., 1985). See also the collection of
contributions to the study of the Dhimmi specifically in the Ottoman Empire in
CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE FUNCTIONING OF A PLURAL
SOCIETY (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., vols. I, II, 1982).
13. Cf. ABU-SAHLIEH, supra note 9, at 52-58.
14. On the dhimma system, and the autonomous role of the communities subject to
it, see Richard B. Rose, Islam and the Development of Personal Status Laws Among
Christian Dhimmis: Motives, Sources, Consequences, 72 MUSLIM WORLD 159 (1982).
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a state that professed to be integrally Islamic. When considered in the
context of their Christian identity, they were forced to exist only within
the confines of socio-juridical enclaves, or "ghettoes." Christian
churches thereupon became "ghettoes" legally, and would perforce be-
come sociologically and psychologically as well. Indeed, the allied com-
bination of the prohibition and corresponding renunciation of evangeli-
zation, and the socio-juridical confinement of Christians within their own
partly and forcibly "autonomous" enclaves, operated a profound distor-
tion in the image of the Christian community. The community was
forced into the alien mold of an ethnic or tribal society, which only prop-
erly survives through natural procreation, with membership determined
by natural descent, and with a role in the life of its members and a share
of their over-all social, political, and legal identity far in excess of that
proper to the Church. 5
The application of this fundamental "meta-constitutional" conception
of the Islamic Res publica-with its consequences for the Christians un-
der its rule-was not, of course, always consistent. Far-reaching constitu-
tional developments within the Ottoman Empire in its last century, as
well as the welcome emergence of a secular Arab national consciousness
in which Christians and Muslims could share in perfect equality, served
as powerful agents of change, even as the Ottoman Empire was collaps-
ing. Later, there were a variety of developments in the several Arab
States with their different, evolving political and legal r6gimes. How-
ever, at the time Ottoman rule in Palestine ended (1917-1918), the legal
r6gime in force was still fundamentally premised on the monistic nature
of the political-religious Islamic Res publica and the consequent constitu-
tional-legal confinement of the tolerated minority religions within their
partly and really forcibly "autonomous" ghettoes. Under the Ottomans,
the "autonomous" ghettoes were known as "millets." It was a system in
which the Muslim religious community was numerically identical with the
political community, and so not properly existent as such, while those not
belonging to it were contained in the socio-juridical "ghettoes" of the
millets.6
15. See D.-M. A. Jaeger, Christianity in the Holy Land: The Main Issues, in PAPERS
READ AT THE 1979 TANTUR CONFERENCE ON CHRISTIANITY IN THE HOLY LAND 74-78
(D.-M. A. Jaeger ed., 1981).
16. See generally ANTON ODEH ISSA, LES MINORITES CHRETIENNES DE
PALESTINE: A TRAVERS LES SIECLES 101-226 (1976) (providing vicissitudes occurring
during the approximately thirteen centuries from the first Muslim conquest to the end of
the Ottoman rule in the Holy Land); CHARLES A. FRAZEE, CATHOLICS AND SULTANS:
THE CHURCH AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1453-1923, at 59-64, 145-50, 214-20, 304-11
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Following its liberation-occupation of Palestine in 1917-1918, Great
Britain, both as belligerent occupant, and later as the mandatory power
on behalf of the League of Nations, essentially was committed to up-
holding the legal r6gime of church-state relations already in place in Pal-
estine. Pending final disposition of Palestine, though, Great Britain per-
fected, adapted, and consolidated these relations.
The State of Israel inherited this state of affairs with its founding in
May 1948. It was in direct contradiction with Israel's Declaration of In-
dependence, which envisaged a completely different kind of political so-
ciety, namely, a modern democracy, predicated on the equality of all its
citizens before the law. Israel's vision is evident from its unconditional
promise that the state:
will be based on freedom, justice and peace by the prophets of
Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political
rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it
will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, educa-
tion and culture.7
The original vision of the modern Jewish national movement, or "Zi-
onism," like the Declaration of Independence, envisaged a lay modern
democracy, in which citizens would be equal before the law, regardless of
their various choices of religious beliefs. The Zionists anticipated a state
in which the Church would not have to play a role in the lives of its
members beyond that proper, and where the Church would be able to re-
emerge as a spiritual and religious society based on a shared faith. The
Zionists desired to remove the Church from the focus of not necessarily
voluntary quasi-ethnic identification in a context where everyone else
was so identified. Ideally, the Zionists envisioned a State that would be
more like the United States, contemporary England, or post-1984 Italy,
rather than Lebanon, the Balkans, or even Northern Ireland.
Although it would have been entirely natural for the new State to draw
the consequences from its proclaimed self-understanding and formally
abolish the millet r6gime as incompatible with its democratic aspirations,
this did not happen. In fact, the abolition of the Jewish religious com-
munity (Knesset Israel) in the next decade only strengthened that r6gime
by putting the Jewish community in the same position previously occu-
pied by the Muslims. The Muslim community, indeed, has suffered the
(1983) (providing an overview of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the
Ottoman Empire and its resulting impact on the Holy Land).
17. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4, (1948)
(emphasis added).
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most paradoxical fate under this dispensation. Having lost its identifica-
tion with the ruling political community, the Muslim community has not
been able to acquire any communal or institutional structure of its own
and to that extent, still does not have a communal or institutional exis-
tence of its own apart from the state that services it. For the Christian
churches, on the other hand, this turn of events meant that they were to
remain exactly where they had been all along, within sociological, legal,
and civic enclaves that were outside the mainstream of national life. To
this extent, Christian churches were millets, called "Recognized Religious
Communities" under the Israeli system."
Briefly, this system assigns each citizen a religion, which then becomes
part of his civil identity. The State establishes criteria for religious classi-
fication, which in most circumstances, broadly correspond to those re-
ligions concerned. However, discrepancies and contradictions still re-
main. If the particular religion to which a citizen is assigned corresponds
to one of the several "Recognized Religious Communities," the State
leaves the citizen to the operation of the laws and courts of that "com-
munity" with respect to specific matters, notably certain areas of mar-
riage and family law. Normally, a citizen may not opt out of the religion
assigned to him or her except by formal conversion to another religion.
In any case, there are no provisions for religionless persons or any others
who so choose to contract marriage, for example, or to be buried. The
system of religious classification as part of the citizen's civil identity vis-A-
vis the State and society both express and powerfully reinforce present
ethnic distinctions in society. It acts as a guarantor of enforced "group
identity," which is a powerful barrier against assimilation. Above all,
however, it distorts the process and meaning of assuming a religious
identity-of making choices of faith. By inextricably and perversely ty-
ing faith to belonging (or not belonging) to a given ethnic group, nation-
ality, or tribe, the system of religious classification distorts religious faith
itself.'9 Nowhere is this more unnatural than in the case of Christianity
and the church.
18. See Silvio Ferrari, Libertd Religiosa e Pluralismo Confessinale: II Caso di Israele,
in RACCOLTA DI SCRIrrI IN ONORE DI Pio FEDELE 890-902 (1984) (providing an under-
standing view of how Israel has handled its difficult legacy in this area).
19. Among other things, the system traps in the "Recognized Religious Community,"
all the children and grandchildren of members of that Church, and effectively compels
them to maintain an institutional affiliation with that same Church or another such
Church. Members must abide by this system in order to be able to exercise such funda-
mental civil rights as contracting marriage or burial. This renders largely meaningless the
basic statistics of Church membership.
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Indeed, it cannot be said that under this system the churches them-
selves are accorded recognition of their proper identity. Rather, the
"Recognized Religious Communities" are a creation of the State, and as
such a construct of the civil law. This is brought out clearly by the 1926
Religious Communities Ordinance which still appears to be in effect.
The Ordinance recognizes the non-Jewish religious community as only a
substratum of sorts, having no more than a certain potentia oboedientialis,
or a mere radical capacity for legal personality and legally recognized or-
ganization. For the religious community to acquire legal capacity and a
legally recognized organization, it must petition the Minister of Religious
Affairs-a figure that is a relic from an earlier, very different kind of
constitutional r6gime. If the Minister accepts the petition, he may enact
regulations for that religious community, bestowing legal recognition
upon it, pursuant to his own authority and the authority of the State un-
der the Ordinance, its statutes, or bylaws. Obviously, Catholic churches,
recognized for the purpose of the operation of personal status laws and
the tribunals that administer them, never petitioned the Minister to or-
ganize them in this manner and were therefore repeatedly subjected to
court challenges as to their legal personality in the State of Israel.20
While the courts of the Catholic Church, sui iuris, have functioned
fully, under the different statutes that govern the operation of the "per-
sonal status" laws, independent of formal legal organization and religious
community status, the vaunted "autonomy" that this independence gives
the churches might itself, in the last analysis, turn out to be something
quite different. Any possible benefits of the churches' independence
surely are outweighed by such results of this system as the deleterious
"balkanization" of society and the inequality of citizens before the law.
It could be argued that the State, far from recognizing the independence
of the canonical legal order, co-opts it materially, and makes it formally
part of its own law, with a variety of possible consequences, such as the
possible ability of the civil courts to treat questions of canon law arising
before them as questions of law coming within judicial notice, as in iura
novit curia, rather than questions of fact as would presumably be the case
20. See The Greek Patriarchate v. Ramle Municipality, Israel Law Reports (ILR)
36 (3) 670 (exemplifying the Israeli Supreme Court's rejection of such challenges). The
Israeli Court's landmark decisions, such as Greek Patriarchate, came to play an important
role in shaping the favorable position assumed by the Delegation of the State of Israel,
which made it possible to adopt Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Fundamental Agreement, as
well as the Agreement's further implementation by means of the Legal Personality
Agreement (currently awaiting signature).
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with any independent legal order.21 In addition, the tribunals of the
churches, put in the false position of servicing the civil legal construct of
the "Recognized Religious Community," may find themselves having to
hear cases and decide questions that fall distinctly outside the proper, or
at least appropriate, reach of ecclesiastical or spiritual law, and to regu-
late issues for which no body of canonical norms actually may exist.
Hence, a body of norms or "Personal Status" code may have to be in-
vented to deal with matters more appropriately and expertly dealt with
by the civil legislature and judiciary, such as matters in which all citizens
should be equal before a body of enlightened law made by their demo-
cratically elected representatives "without distinction of religion, race or
sex."
22
Finally, the millet, or the system of "Recognized Religious Communi-
ties," does not recognize the Catholic Church at all. It only makes refer-
ence to the several church sui iuris that are endowed with distinct re-
gional and local hierarchies and particular laws. These churches consist
of the several Eastern Catholic Churches and the Latin Church. The sys-
tem effectively has disregarded the fact that these several churches are in
reality "parts" or "manifestations" of a single body of religious believ-
ers-the Catholic Church.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RItGIME
All of the tensions-indeed, the contradictions-inherent in the sur-
vival of the millet r6gime of the modern State of Israel became instantly
visible in the negotiations over the Fundamental Agreement between the
Holy See and the State of Israel. The chief purpose of these negotiations
was to lay the foundations for the normalization of church-state rela-
tions. The revelation of these contradictions would not in itself have
been a problem if the Delegation of the State of Israel had not assumed
that the Fundamental Agreement could be crafted in such a way as to re-
flect, in essence, the status quo ante with respect to church-state relations,
without any substantial change in the relationship itself and, in part, by
using rather than disregarding the Religions Communities Ordinance.
For its part, however, the Delegation of the Holy See was bound to insist
that in the fundamental legal relationship between the Church and the
21. This is, of course, not a simple matter. For a profound, masterly exposition of the
interaction between state law and "religious law" in Israel, at least under the "ancien rg-
gime," see IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 49-77
(1975).
22. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, (1948).
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State, there had to be a precise determination that the active subject (the
titular or holder) of rights and obligations vis-A-vis the State would be the
Catholic Church,23 not simply the several "Recognized Religious Com-
munities," or even their aggregate, or any other fragmentary institutional
expression of the Church.
Because there was so much at stake for either side, the confrontation
between the differing approaches and expectations of the two Delega-
tions was intense. In the end, Israel yielded by acknowledging that the
negotiations could not go forward at all unless it was prepared to depart
radically from its inherited and incongruously preserved r6gime of state-
church relations. This meant recognizing the Catholic Church as a juridi-
cal subject. In other words, the Catholic Church would be the active
subject of rights and duties vis-A-vis the State, which is another term for
the church-state relationship. It was this courageous, farsighted, and
revolutionary decision on the part of Israel that made it possible for the
negotiations to proceed and for the Fundamental Agreement to take
shape.
The Delegation of the Holy See never intended to demand the aboli-
tion, hic et nunc, of the "Recognized Religious Communities" regime.
The Delegation assured the State of Israel that it understood that the cu-
rious survival of this old r6gime was tied to internal needs and debates
within the majority Jewish population, and that its continued applicabil-
ity to the State's Christian citizens was simply incident to these factors.
For this reason, the Church had not taken any public position or initia-
tive on the matter, but would simply await the eventual resolution of the
internal Jewish debate, at times, almost a Kulturkampf, in the confident
hope that ultimately the inherent logic and dynamic integrity of the
Declaration of Independence would prevail, leading to the quiet aban-
donment of the "Recognized Religious Communities" r6gime. The
Delegations of the Holy See and of the State of Israel converged on this
matter, laying the foundations for a totally new legal r6gime of church-
state relations. This new r6gime under the Fundamental Agreement
would operate in conjunction with the old millet or "Recognized Relig-
ious Communities" regime. While utterly incompatible in their assump-
tions, principles, and essential purposes, the two r6gimes are destined to
live side by side for the foreseeable future and need not clash much in
practice. The "Recognized Religious Communities" r6gime needs to ex-
23. Cf. Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel, Dec.
30, 1993, Vatican-Isr., art. 3, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. 153, 155 (1994) [hereinafter Fundamental
Agreement] (recognizing the rights of the Catholic Church).
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tend to a very narrow and specialized area, mostly certain parts of family
law, while the vast expanse of church-state relations is left without com-
petition to the terms of the Fundamental Agreement.
Still, some of the legal experts taking part in the negotiations insisted
on the need to create some link between the old and the new r6gime.
Accordingly, the legal experts identified this new, hitherto unheard of
subject, the Catholic Church, in terms of the several bodies that were
considered to be known to the law under the old r6gime as the new sub-
ject of the Fundamental Agreement. These complex, delicate, and ardu-
ous negotiations ultimately became Article 13, paragraph 1 of the
Agreement.
Initially, the Delegation of the Holy See entertained some doubt as to
whether there was really a need to link the two r6gimes. In the end, it
agreed that some transitional language between the old and the new or-
der could be devised, provided it was absolutely clear that this entirely
"new" active subject, the Catholic Church, was in no way reducible to the
aggregate of the bodies "recognized" by the old r6gime. Hence, the all
important "inter alia" language in Article 13, paragraph 1(a) was created.
This transitional norm can be said to represent a distinct advantage to
the Church. While the language makes it clear that the Church's rights
and freedoms proclaimed and recognized in the Fundamental Agree-
ment apply to all of the "recognized" bodies, it by no means confines
these rights and freedoms to previously "recognized" bodies, but extends
them to the Catholic Church as such.
As the compromise formulation also suggests, the Delegation of the
Holy See was able to maintain the integrity of its position that the
Church "does not know" the "Recognized Religious Communities," as
such an autonomous creation of the civil law, but only "knows" the
church sui iuris: those bodies that belong to it, are legislated by it, and
are subject exclusively to its own laws. The attentive reader of the treaty
norm will see clearly that the Holy See does not refer directly to the
"Recognized Religious Communities." Instead, it provides that the Holy
See "knows" the Church sui iuris and the State "knows" the "Recog-
nized Religious Communities." The assumption is made that these are
two formalities under which the same material reality is found. Although
this is not an entirely accurate assumption, there is enough truth to it to
24serve the present purpose.
24. Article 13, paragraph 1(c) was added both to respect the principle of reciprocity
and to prevent any claims (of which the Delegations were warned in the course of the ne-
gotiations) by Israel's local authorities that they were not bound by the state's treaty. See
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A New Legal Rggime of Church-State Relations
The Fundamental Agreement's creation of a whole new conceptual
framework for church-state legal relations necessarily reaches far beyond
the Agreement itself, providing the entire dynamic for the process set in
motion by the Fundamental Agreement.25 The Fundamental Agreement
gives broad recognition to the Catholic Church's "subjecthood," the in-
dependence and sovereignty of its Supreme Authority, and the Church's
co-ordinate, rather than subordinate, status with the State.2' This recog-
nition receives detailed, concrete, and practical expression in the first
treaty after the creation of the Fundamental Agreement to be produced
by the Bilateral Commission between the Holy See and the State of Is-
rael. The Commission concluded the treaty for the purpose of complet-
ing and implementing the Fundamental Agreement. Significantly, this
treaty drafted pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Fundamental
Agreement, and awaiting signature as these words are written, estab-
lishes2 7 that in the forum of the State, questions of canon law shall be
considered questions of fact, as are, in Israel, all questions concerning the
law of other independent legal orders, such as foreign states. Thus, the
treaty sweepingly ends any possibility of the appropriation of canon law
by the State, which might have resulted from the millet or "Recognized
Religious Community" r6gime. More importantly, the treaty recognizes
the canonical legal order as being as complete, independent, and sover-
eign within the sphere of competence proper to the Church as that of the
State itself, or any State. This advance does, in turn, involve assump-
tions, implications, and consequences that are the exact opposite of those
characterizing the attitude to the Church of the millet or "Recognized
Religious Communities" regime.
More profoundly, the Fundamental Agreement and the Legal Person-
ality Agreementm put an end definitively and irrevocably to any possible
applicability to the Catholic Church or any of its Church sui iuris of the
model of religious community organization legislated in the aforemen-
tioned Religious Communities Ordinance, otherwise still in force. In-
stead of being an amorphous substratum that needs to be organized by
government edict, the Catholic Church is now fully recognized as a whole
and in its diverse formations and expressions. The Church has solidified
Fundamental Agreement, supra note 23, art. 13, para. 1(c), at 158.
25. See id. art. 12; id. art. 3, para. 3; id. art. 10, para. 2.
26. See id. art. 3, paras. 1-2.
27. See id. art. 9.
28. The Legal Personality Agreement was made pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 3 of
the Fundamental Agreement. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 23, art. 3, para. 3,
at 155.
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its status as an organic, sovereign, and independent society, with its own
primary legal order, Sovereign Authority, and administrative, judicial,
and legislative apparatus.
Thirteen centuries of legal history have come to an end. A new legal
r6gime of relations between the Catholic Church and the State has been
put in place in the heart of the Middle East. Both as a testimony to some
other states in the region, where salutary secularization, democratization,
and legal modernization are still to reach analogous levels, and as a mile-
stone on Israel's long road to achieving more fully the vision articulated
in its own Declaration of Independence, the new legal r6gime built on the
foundation of the Fundamental Agreement is at once a notable achieve-
ment and solemn promise, a solid realization, and a beacon of hope.
